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CopyAbstract: The cognitive functioning of individuals with stronger endorsement of right-wing and prejudiced attitudes
has elicited much scholarly interest. Whereas many studies investigated cognitive styles, less attention has been
directed towards cognitive ability. Studies investigating the latter topic generally reveal lower cognitive ability to
be associated with stronger endorsement of right-wing ideological attitudes and greater prejudice. However, this re-
lationship has remained widely unrecognized in literature. The present meta-analyses revealed an average effect size
of r=.20 [95% conﬁdence interval (95% CI) [0.23, 0.17]; based on 67 studies, N=84017] for the relationship
between cognitive ability and right-wing ideological attitudes and an average effect size of r=.19 (95% CI [0.23,
0.16]; based on 23 studies, N=27011) for the relationship between cognitive ability and prejudice. Effect sizes did
not vary signiﬁcantly across different cognitive abilities and sample characteristics. The effect strongly depended on
the measure used for ideological attitudes and prejudice, with the strongest effect sizes for authoritarianism and
ethnocentrism. We conclude that cognitive ability is an important factor in the genesis of ideological attitudes and
prejudice and thus should become more central in theorizing and model building. Copyright © 2015 European
Association of Personality Psychology
Key words: attitudes; cognitive processes; social groupsCognitive ability pertains to an individual’s capacity to per-
form higher cognitive processes, such as problem solving,
reasoning, remembering and understanding. Although at ﬁrst
glance cognitive ability may only seem relevant to perfor-
mance on cognitive and intellectual tasks, it has many social
implications as well. Indeed, a higher cognitive ability is re-
lated to a host of social behaviours and interactions, such as
increased interpersonal sensitivity (Murphy & Hall, 2011),
higher altruism (Millet & Dewitte, 2006) and greater (politi-
cal) trust (Sturgis, Read & Allum, 2010). Furthermore, re-
search has shown that cognitive ability has substantial
effects on attitude formation as well, demonstrating correla-
tions with lower levels of religiosity (Zuckerman, Silberman
& Hall, 2013) and a greater preference for evolutionary,
novel ideas (Kanazawa, 2010, 2012). The role of cognitive
ability may also be important for our understanding of both
prejudice and ideological attitudes, a topic on the agenda of
scholars more than 60 years ago (e.g. Adorno, Frenkel-
Brunswik, Levinson & Sanford, 1950; Allport, 1954; for a
review, see Dhont & Hodson, 2014). As concluded by
Adorno and colleagues, ‘the most ethnocentric are, on the av-
erage, less intelligent than the least ethnocentric’ (p. 284). Inespondence to: Emma Onraet, Department of Developmental, Person-
nd Social Psychology, Ghent University, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000,
t, Belgium.
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right © 2015 European Association of Personality Psychologyline with this observation, several recent investigations con-
ﬁrm that greater cognitive ability is negatively related with
right-wing ideological attitudes and prejudice (e.g. Deary,
Batty & Gale, 2008; Hodson & Busseri, 2012; Van Hiel,
Onraet & De Pauw, 2010).
Yet, the vast majority of contemporary theories
explaining intergroup attitudes and behaviour specify little
or no theoretical role for cognitive abilities, instead focusing
on factors such as intergroup contact (Hodson & Hewstone,
2013; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), anxiety and threat (Onraet,
Van Hiel, Dhont & Pattyn, 2013; Riek, Mania & Gaertner,
2006; Stephan, 2014), social identity concerns (Tajfel &
Turner, 1979), competition for dominance or resources
(Bobo, 1999; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), empathy (Batson
et al., 1997), essentialist thinking (Hodson & Skorska,
2015; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a), out-group dehumanization
(Leyens et al., 2000; Hodson, MacInnis & Costello, 2014) or
disgust sensitivity (Hodson et al., 2013), to name a few.
Mental or cognitive abilities, as related to ideological atti-
tudes and prejudice, are strikingly absent from the compre-
hensive Handbook of Social Psychology (Fiske, Gilbert, &
Lindzey, 2010), and from popular and widely used texts
and textbooks that deal speciﬁcally with stereotyping, preju-
dice and discrimination (e.g. Brown, 2010; Dovidio,
Hewstone, Glick & Esses, 2010; Nelson, 2009; Schneider,
2004; Whitley & Kite, 2010). To the extent that cognitiveReceived 13 February 2015
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600 E. Onraet et al.factors are implicated, the ﬁeld largely emphasizes cognitive
styles, that is, preferences for modes of information process-
ing, such as need for closure (NFC) or structure (e.g. Jost,
Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Roets & Van Hiel,
2011b; Van Hiel et al., 2010). In other words, motivation
for simple and ordered thinking drives people towards
right-leaning ideologies and prejudice.
All of these factors are arguably important correlates of
ideological attitudes and prejudice, but what about cognitive
abilities? It is possible that contemplating these relations is
considered unsavoury, contentious or overly controversial,
encouraging researchers to underplay links between, for
instance, ability and ideology (e.g. Block & Block, 2006;
Fraley, Grifﬁn, Belsky&Roisman, 2012), with such topics pos-
sibly considered ‘impolite’ for academic discussion (Hodson,
2014). Moreover, there exist strong doubts in the ﬁeld about
whether mental abilities are actually relevant contributors to
the outcomes we seek to explain. For instance, Duarte et al. (in
press) opine that, based on their reading of the literature, the data
do ‘…not yield a consistent liberal advantage [in abilities], even
a small one’. This raises the question of whether relations exist
between ability, on the one hand, and ideology and prejudice,
on the other, and whether such relations represent very small
effects (and are thus inconsequential) or sizeable (and thus
relevant to explaining ideology and intergroup relations).
In keeping with the Association for Psychological Sci-
ence best practices and an emphasis on the ‘new statistics’
(Cumming, 2014), we bring a cumulative science approach
to this research question, conducting a meta-analysis of the
empirical studies of the association of cognitive ability with
right-wing ideology and prejudice. We argue that meta-
analyses are particularly needed and valuable when relations
between variables are relatively unknown or under-
represented and when variable inter-relations are controver-
sial and contentious, as with the relation between cognitive
ability and ideology.1 In such circumstances, meta-analyses
not only provide a quantitative review of the existing litera-
ture but also offer generative insights for new research and
theorizing. In our analysis, we were especially interested in
whether the strength of the relations under study depends
on the type of cognitive ability. Based on the Cattell–
Horn–Carroll (CHC) model of cognitive ability (McGrew,
2005; Schneider &McGrew, 2012), we distinguished between
different types of cognitive abilities. We also investigated the
potential moderating effects of several other variables such as
type of outcome and sample characteristics.Right-wing ideological attitudes and prejudice: the role of
cognition
Prejudice largely involves negative evaluations of and beliefs
about out-groups, such as other ethnic groups, women,1Despite being under-represented in theoretical accounts of ideological atti-
tudes and prejudice, there exists considerable interest in this topic, among ac-
ademics and lay people; the paper by Hodson and Busseri (2012) was the
most downloaded article of any American Physical Society journal in that
year, with over 56 000 downloads (http://www.psychologicalscience.org/re-
design/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Journals.pdf). Topics generating this
degree of interest clearly warrant, we argue, a quantitative review.
Copyright © 2015 European Association of Personality Psychologyhomosexuals and the elderly. Two broad research traditions
have historically sought to unveil the psychological basis of
prejudice. Whereas some focused on the impact of situational
and contextual factors, such as (intergroup) threat (e.g. Riek
et al., 2006), others investigated the role of individual differ-
ences and personality predispositions (Adorno et al., 1950;
Allport, 1954). In their well-known book The Authoritarian
Personality, Adorno et al. (1950) argued that authoritarian
personality characteristics lead people to adhere to extreme
right-wing parties and prejudice. Since then, other relevant
attitudinal individual differences have been related to right-
wing ideology and prejudice, including tough-mindedness
(Eysenck, 1954), dogmatism (Rokeach, 1960) and conserva-
tism (Wilson, 1973). These attitudes can all be divided under
the category of ‘right-wing socio-cultural attitudes’, broadly
referring to adherence to traditional values and norms and re-
sistance to change (Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt & Sibley,
2009; Jost et al., 2003). Right-wing authoritarianism
(RWA; Altemeyer 1981, 1998) is a typical indicator of this
pattern of broad social beliefs (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009).
The three RWA facets—uncritically submitting to authori-
ties, adhering to societal norms and traditions and showing
aggressiveness towards individuals who deviate from these
conventional norms and values—all tap into the social–
cultural domain. Most conservatism scales and dogmatism
also refer to the social–cultural domain.
We focus on one prominent research question that has
elicited interest among scholars for a long time. Speciﬁcally,
do individuals with stronger endorsement of right-wing and
prejudiced attitudes score higher or lower on speciﬁc cogni-
tive characteristics, differentiating them from individuals
with rather left-wing and less prejudiced attitudes? In the
social psychological literature, there is a long and widely ac-
cepted tradition linking limited cognitive resources with
intergroup biases and ideological attitudes. For instance, the
well-known study by Gilbert and Hixon (1991), a staple in
most prejudice textbooks, demonstrated that when cogni-
tively busy (e.g. rehearsing a digit sequence or performing a
visual search task while performing the central task), partici-
pants are less likely to activate stereotypes but are signiﬁ-
cantly more likely to apply (i.e. ‘use’) stereotypes that are
activated (or salient). Others have observed that people under
high (versus low) cognitive load are more likely to recall
stereotypic traits (e.g. Macrae, Hewstone & Grifﬁths, 1993;
Pratto & Bargh, 1991). With regard to ideological attitudes,
Eidelman, Crandall, Goodman and Blanchar (2012) have
demonstrated that inducing low-effort thinking (e.g. alcohol
consumption, cognitive load and time pressure) results in
stronger endorsement of politically conservative ideologies,
such that ‘conservatism may be a process consequence of
low-effort thought’ (Eidelman et al., 2012, p. 808). Underly-
ing each of these experimental methodologies is the assump-
tion that lower availability of cognitive resources elicits more
social conservatism and prejudice-relevant thinking. This
basic premise, when framed experimentally within a social
psychology context, courts little controversy. Yet, when
exported to the realm of individual differences, such that
those lower in cognitive abilities are purportedly higher in
social conservatism and prejudicial attitudes, this idea has lessEur. J. Pers. 29: 599–621 (2015)
DOI: 10.1002/per
Ability, right-wing attitudes and prejudice 601traction. However, the underlying principles are very closely
related if not analogous—to the extent that lesser mental ability
is related to these outcomes; this should be true whether the
ability limitation is based on an individual difference or is ex-
perimentally induced (see E. T. Higgins, 2000, for a discussion
of ‘general principles’ across person and situation effects).
Indeed, some scholars have argued that individuals with
lower cognitive skills are relatively ill-equipped to process
complex and new social information and to understand con-
stantly changing societal contexts. Therefore, they are more
likely to stick to what is presently known and considered ac-
ceptable, rather than being open-minded and appreciating
multidimensional perspectives (Deary et al., 2008; Heaven,
Ciarrochi & Leeson, 2011; McCourt, Bouchard, Lykken,
Tellegen & Keyes, 1999; Stankov, 2009). By emphasizing
societal traditions, the preservation of the status quo and
strict group boundaries, ideologies endorsing resistance to
social change, that is, right-wing ideologies (Jost et al.,
2003), should be particularly appealing to those with lower
cognitive abilities (e.g. Heaven et al., 2011; Keiller, 2010;
Stankov, 2009). According to this theoretical perspective,
therefore, right-wing ideologies provide well-structured and
ordered views about society and intergroup relations, thereby
psychologically minimizing the complexity of the social
world. Theoretically, therefore, those with fewer cognitive
resources drift towards right-wing conservative ideologies
in an attempt to increase psychological control over their
context. Furthermore, studies have shown that being cogni-
tively restricted when engaging in complex mental process-
ing and high-effort thinking (Eidelman et al., 2012)
facilitates reliance on simple heuristics in social judgments,
which in turn lead to quick and biased views about other
groups (Heaven et al., 2011; Hodson & Busseri, 2012;
Keiller, 2010). Although initially under-investigated, cogni-
tive ability has gradually gained importance in the ﬁeld of
ideological attitudes and prejudice (e.g., Deary et al., 2008;
Dhont & Hodson, 2014; Hodson, 2014; Van Hiel et al.,
2010). In the next sections, we provide an overview of the
empirical studies investigating associations of cognitive abil-
ity with both right-wing ideological attitudes and prejudice.Cognitive ability and right-wing ideological attitudes
Adorno et al. (1950) already investigated the relationship
between cognitive ability and authoritarianism, and many
studies followed this ﬁrst inquiry, reporting negative relations
between cognitive ability and authoritarianism (e.g. Adorno
et al., 1950; Christie, 1954; Davids & Eriksen, 1957;
Jacobson & Rettig, 1959; Siegel, 1956). Similar results were
obtained with the Dogmatism Scale (Long & Ziller, 1965;
Thompson &Michel, 1972; Uhes & Shaver, 1970) and, more
recently, for a range of measures tapping right-wing ideolog-
ical attitudes (e.g. Bouchard, Segal, Tellegen, McGue, Keyes
& Krueger, 2003; Kanazawa, 2010; Keiller, 2010; McCourt
et al., 1999). Further evidence for this association was ob-
tained on the cross-national level by Stankov (2009), who
found that inhabitants of conservative countries typically
show lower average performance across different ability tests.
A meta-analysis (Van Hiel et al., 2010), including data fromCopyright © 2015 European Association of Personality Psychology50 studies, reported an average correlation of r=.26 be-
tween cognitive ability and right-wing ideological attitudes,
including conservatism, authoritarianism and dogmatism.
Moreover, several longitudinal studies, some using large rep-
resentative samples, provided evidence for the direction of the
relation, demonstrating that lower general cognitive ability in
childhood relates to stronger endorsement of conservative
and authoritarian attitudes later in life (Block & Block,
2006; Deary et al., 2008; Fraley, et al., 2012; Heaven et al.,
2011; Schoon, Cheng, Gale, Batty & Deary, 2010).
Remarkably, despite the use of various cognitive ability
measures across studies, scholars paid little attention to the
potential differential impact of the various types of cognitive
ability. However, a few studies simultaneously contrasted
various types of cognitive abilities. For instance, Heaven
et al. (2011) reported that among 12- to 13-year-olds, lower
verbal abilities predict RWA ﬁve years later in time, whereas
numerical abilities did not show such longitudinal effect.
Kemmelmeier (2008) observed weak signiﬁcant negative as-
sociations of verbal ability with two of three indicators for
conservative attitudes and a positive association with a third
indicator (i.e. anti-regulation attitudes), yet numerical ability
did not yield any signiﬁcant association. Choma, Hodson,
Hoffarth, Charlesford and Hafer (2014) similarly found nu-
merical reasoning to be unrelated to RWA. Deary et al.
(2008) reported negative relationships of comparable
strength between conservatism (i.e. items tapping into politi-
cal distrust, social conservatism and anti-working women) on
the one hand and two verbal ability tasks (mean r across
sexes =.18 and .17), a reasoning task (mean r=.15)
and a short-time memory task (mean r=.10) on the other
hand. In sum, the results of these few studies yielded rather
mixed ﬁndings with respect to potential differences between
cognitive ability types.Cognitive ability and prejudice
In the early studies, ethnocentrism, a form of prejudice
towards ethnic out-groups in general, was particularly stud-
ied. Adorno et al. (1950) devoted an entire chapter on the
relationship between cognitive ability and ethnocentrism,
which was found to be negative. This initial ﬁnding was rep-
licated in other studies across diverse samples and with di-
verse indicators of cognitive ability, such as reasoning tests
(e.g. Eysenck, 1954; Kutner & Gordon, 1964; O’Connor,
1952), verbal ability tests (e.g. Egan, 1989) and general
cognitive ability tests (Rokeach, 1951). More recently,
Meeusen, de Vroome and Hooghe (2013) also revealed
negative correlations between measures of verbal and mathe-
matical abilities and ethnocentrism.
Other studies recently focused on prejudice expressed
towards speciﬁc out-groups. Keiller (2010) reported that
abstract reasoning is negatively related to prejudice against
homosexuals. Costello and Hodson (2014) found that White
children who are more able to comprehend hierarchical rela-
tions among objects (e.g. that cars and trucks belong to the
superordinate category vehicles) express less racial bias
towards Black children. Furthermore, longitudinal studies
provided evidence for the effect of cognitive ability early inEur. J. Pers. 29: 599–621 (2015)
DOI: 10.1002/per
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sentative datasets, Deary et al. (2008), Schoon et al. (2010)
and Hodson and Busseri (2012) demonstrated that cognitive
ability in childhood leads not only to increased right-wing
ideological attitudes but also to increased racism later in
adulthood. A recent literature review on this topic by Dhont
and Hodson (2014) concluded that ‘the ﬁeld will beneﬁt from
a recognition of, and open discussion about, differences in
cognitive abilities between those lower versus higher in
prejudice’ (p. 454).
Similar to the literature on cognitive ability and right-
wing ideological attitudes, little attention has been devoted
to the possible differential impact of distinct types of cogni-
tive ability. Only one study (Deary et al., 2008), using a large
and representative dataset, reported associations of various
strengths between racism and two verbal ability tasks (mean
rs across sexes =.23 and .19), a reasoning task (mean
r=.15) and a short-time memory task (mean r=.12).The present study
The present study is a meta-analytic integration of empirical
research on the relationship of cognitive ability with both
right-wing social–cultural ideological attitudes and inter-
group prejudice. The present meta-analyses extend the
meta-analysis on cognitive ability by Van Hiel et al. (2010)
in three important ways. First, since Van Hiel et al. collected
samples for their meta-analysis in early 2009, several impor-
tant studies, some with large samples or longitudinal data,
have been published (e.g. Heaven et al., 2011; Hodson &
Busseri, 2012; Kanazawa, 2010; Keiller, 2010; Schoon
et al., 2010; Stankov, 2009; Xu, Mar & Peterson, 2013),
which we included in the present analysis. Based on this lit-
erature and the meta-analysis of Van Hiel et al. (2010), we
expected that lower cognitive abilities predict more right-
wing ideological attitudes and greater prejudice. Second,
whereas Van Hiel et al. only examined relationships with
ethnocentrism as an indicator of prejudice, we also in-
cluded studies that administered other indicators of preju-
dice (e.g. Costello & Hodson, 2014; Keiller, 2010).
Third, the present meta-analysis aimed to investigate the
potential differential effects of speciﬁc types of cognitive
ability, which was not examined by Van Hiel and colleagues.
Research to date has typically used very diverse types and
measures of cognitive ability, but little attention has been di-
rected towards the question of whether particular types of
cognitive ability might be especially relevant in ideology
and prejudice. In other words, is the association between cog-
nitive ability and right-wing ideological attitudes and preju-
dice consistent across all types of cognitive ability, or are
these relationships largely driven by particular types of cogni-
tive abilities? To investigate this, we divided all samples
included in our meta-analysis into categories according to
the measure of cognitive ability employed. The cognitive
ability measures were classiﬁed according to the CHC theory
of cognitive abilities (McGrew, 2005; Schneider & McGrew,
2012), considered one of the most empirically well-supported
and widely accepted comprehensive theoretical frameworks
of the structure of cognitive abilities (e.g. Flanagan, GenshaftCopyright © 2015 European Association of Personality Psychology& Harrison, 2012). Speciﬁcally, the CHC model proposed
three levels: g is the highest level, representing general cogni-
tive ability. Underlying g are nine primary broad domains
who each contribute to the higher-order g-factor. These nine
primary domains are: ﬂuid reasoning (Gf), the broad ability
to reason and solve novel problems; comprehension–
knowledge ability (Gc), static abilities based on one’s previ-
ously acquired knowledge; short-term memory (Gsm), the
ability to encode, maintain and manipulate information in
the immediate situation; long-term storage and retrieval
(Glr), the ability to store and retrieve information in long-term
memory; visual–spatial processing (Gv), the ability to per-
ceive, generate, store and retrieve visual and spatial informa-
tion; auditory processing (Ga), abilities involved in detecting
and interpreting sounds; cognitive processing speed (Gs), the
ability to quickly and ﬂuently perform relatively simple cog-
nitive tasks; reading and writing (Grw), individual’s depth
and breadth of reading and writing knowledge and skills;
and ﬁnally, quantitative knowledge (Gq), the individual’s
depth and breadth of quantitative or mathematical knowledge
and skills.
In sum, the present meta-analysis extends the meta-
analysis of Van Hiel et al. (2010) by the following actions:
(i) including new and recent studies for the relationship be-
tween cognitive ability and right-wing ideological attitudes;
(ii) including various measures of prejudice and (iii) investi-
gating whether the speciﬁc type of cognitive ability inﬂu-
ences the strength of the relationship. Because it is widely
acknowledged that right-wing ideological attitudes and prej-
udice are conceptually distinct (e.g. Altemeyer, 1981;
Duckitt, 2001), we perform two separate meta-analyses,
one for the relationship between cognitive ability and right-
wing ideological attitudes and one for the relationship
between cognitive ability and prejudice (including both
measures of generalized prejudice and prejudice towards spe-
ciﬁc groups).METHOD
Selection of studies: search strategies and inclusion
criteria
Studies for this meta-analysis were selected by using a vari-
ety of search strategies. First, we identiﬁed the relevant stud-
ies included in Van Hiel et al.’s (2010) meta-analysis,
excluding the studies focusing on education rather than pure
cognitive abilities. Second, we searched the databases ISI
Web of Knowledge and Google Scholar for studies pub-
lished until November 2014. We used a variety of keywords
in various combinations. Keywords for right-wing ideologi-
cal attitudes were authoritarianism, conservatism and dogma-
tism. Keywords for intergroup prejudice were racism,
sexism, ethnocentrism, prejudice, ethnic prejudice, racial
prejudice and intolerance. Keywords for cognitive ability
were cognitive ability, mental ability, reasoning, intelligence
and IQ. Third, we checked the references list of each relevant
article for additional studies of interest. Finally, we contacted
researchers in the ﬁeld to share relevant unpublished data.Eur. J. Pers. 29: 599–621 (2015)
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or mailing lists of the International Society of Political Psy-
chology, Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Eu-
ropean Association of Social Psychology and the Social
Psychology Network. Three researchers contacted us and
shared their unpublished data.
Studies had to meet several criteria to be included in the
meta-analysis. First, studies had to administer at least one
measure of right-wing ideological attitudes or intergroup
prejudice and at least one measure of cognitive ability. Fur-
thermore, no sample overlap was allowed because samples
included in a meta-analysis have to be statistically indepen-
dent (Card, 2012; Mullen, 1989). When studies included
multiple types of ideological or out-group attitudes or multi-
ple types of cognitive ability in the same sample, we selected
the type least prevalent across the other samples (see also
Onraet et al., 2013; Van Hiel et al., 2010). When multiple
indicators of a single type of right-wing ideological or out-
group attitudes (e.g. multiple subscales of a conservatism
scale) or multiple indicators of a single primary domain of
cognitive ability (e.g. different indicators of ﬂuid ability)
were administered, the mean correlation was calculated and
used for the analyses.Study characteristics and coding
For the relationship between cognitive ability and right-wing
ideological attitudes, we found 67 samples, with a total of
84 017 unique participants, meeting the inclusion criteria
for the meta-analysis. For the relationship between cognitive
ability and prejudice, we found 23 samples, with a total of
27 011 unique participants, meeting the inclusion criteria
for the meta-analysis. All studies are displayed in Table 1,
and forest plots with each study’s effect size and 95% conﬁ-
dence intervals (CIs) are displayed in Figure 1 (for right-
wing ideological attitudes) and Figure 2 (for prejudice). In
total, over both meta-analyses combined, we now have 82
unique samples, with 94 398 unique participants. We re-
trieved 32 additional studies, which comprised 78 840 extra
participants compared with the meta-analysis of Van Hiel
et al. (2010).
We coded each sample for design, sample and publica-
tion characteristics. First, we coded each study according to
the speciﬁc type of right-wing ideological attitudes or preju-
dice used: authoritarianism, conservatism2 or dogmatism for
right-wing ideological attitudes and ethnocentrism or preju-
dice towards speciﬁc groups as types of prejudice. Next,
we also coded the type of cognitive ability according to the
CHC model. We decided to create two moderator variables
for the distinction between different types of cognitive. First,
we distinguished between different levels of cognitive abil-
ity. More speciﬁcally, we coded whether the measure tapped
the following: (i) a higher-order factor of general ability
(studies using scores of entire intelligence tests or studies
combining several types of broad abilities into one factor)
or (ii) one speciﬁc type of broad primary ability (without2Conservatism consists of measures of political conservatism and social con-
servatism and measures combining both social and economic conservatism.
Copyright © 2015 European Association of Personality Psychologyspecifying which type of broad primary ability). For the sec-
ond moderator variable, we coded the latter studies according
to the speciﬁc type of primary broad domains of the CHC
model. For this second moderator analysis on type of cogni-
tive ability, the studies using general ability measures were
not included.
Sample characteristics were according to age group in
which cognitive ability was administered [children (0–11years
old), adolescents (12–17 years old), young adolescents
(18–27 years old) and adults (27+years old)], sex composi-
tion (mixed sex, males only and females only) and geographic
location of the sample (United States/Canada, Europe and
other). As an indicator of publication characteristic, the year of
data acquisition was coded into three categories, 1950–1969,
1970–1989 and 1990–present.Statistical analyses
Pearson product–moment correlation coefﬁcients (rs) be-
tween cognitive ability and right-wing ideological attitudes/
prejudice were used as effect size estimates. For studies
reporting mean differences in scores on right-wing ideologi-
cal attitudes or prejudice across groups with low or high cog-
nitive ability, the reported test statistics (F-value, t-value or
p-values) were used for calculating the effect sizes
(Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins & Rothstein, 2005). Three
samples only reported a p-value. In these cases, we used
the lower limit effect size estimates from the reported signif-
icance level. This meta-analytic decision is commonly used
but a conservative strategy that tends to underestimate the
true magnitude of effect sizes (Durlak & Lipsey, 1991).
For the statistical meta-analyses, we used the software
COMPREHENSIVE META-ANALYSIS version 2.2 (Borenstein
et al., 2005) in combination with metafor, a meta-analysis
package for R (Viechtbauer, 2010). We applied a random-
effects model to compute the overall effects, because we
assumed that effect sizes would vary across studies.
Random-effects models produce results that can be general-
ized to future studies with different designs (Hedges &
Vevea, 1998). First, Fisher-Z coefﬁcients were calculated
based on the Pearson correlations to permit an unbiased com-
parison of effect sizes. Second, we computed mean weighted
effect sizes and 95% CIs around the point estimate of the
combined estimates. Next, for interpretation convenience, the
effect size estimates were transformed back to correlations. Ac-
cording to Cohen (1988), effect sizes (rs) of .10 are considered
small effects, .30 are considered moderate effects and .50 are
considered large effects. Based on an analysis of meta-analysis
in psychological research, Hemphill (2003) recommended
interpreting effect sizes of .10, .20 and .30 as small, moderate
and large effects, respectively, to better reﬂect effect sizes in
psychology per se.
Homogeneity analyses were conducted to test whether
the sets of effect sizes were homogeneous at the population
level and allowed us to examine the role of potential
moderator variables. We conducted these moderation analy-
ses using categorical testing procedures (Lipsey & Wilson,
2001). A signiﬁcant within-groups Q (Qw) indicates that
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Copyright © 2015 European Association of Personality Psychologyheterogeneous, whereas a signiﬁcant between-groups Q (Qb)
estimate indicates that the effect sizes of the moderator sub-
groups are signiﬁcantly different. I2 indices (J. P. T. Higgins
& Thompson, 2002) indicate the percentage of variability in
point estimates due to between-study heterogeneity, rather
than sampling error (I2 = 0 indicates that all variability in
effect estimates is caused by sampling error; I2 values on
the order of 25, 50 and 75 represent low, moderate and high
between-study heterogeneity).
Finally, we addressed the robustness of the meta-
analytical estimates by performing sensitivity analyses. These
evaluate (and adjust for) the impact of publication bias as well
as the impact of outliers and inﬂuential studies. The accuracy
of a meta-analysis strongly depends upon the representative-
ness of the sample of studies analysed. Publication bias is
one source that potentially jeopardizes the representativeness
of a meta-analytical sample set because the likelihood that a
study becomes published hinges upon the presence of signif-
icant results (Kepes, Banks, McDaniel & Whetzel, 2012;
Kepes, McDaniel, Brannick & Banks, 2013; Rothstein,
Sutton & Borenstein, 2005). Hence, publication bias might
overestimate the meta-analytical effect sizes. Another impor-
tant source that potentially questions meta-analytic conclu-
sions is the presence of outliers and inﬂuential cases (Kepes
et al., 2013; Viechtbauer & Cheung, 2010). Even though it
is not uncommon to observe extreme effect size values when
conducting a meta-analysis, it is mandatory to illuminate to
which extent these outliers/inﬂuential cases weigh upon the
meta-analytic conclusions.
These sensitivity analyses involved the combination of
four recommended techniques (Kepes et al., 2012, 2013;
Stanley & Doucouliagos; 2014; Viechtbauer & Cheung,
2010). First, we addressed the presence of publication bias
and outliers by visually inspecting contour-enhanced funnel
plots (Peters, Sutton, Jones, Abrams & Rushton, 2008; Kepes
et al., 2013; Sterne et al., 2011). Contour-enhanced funnel plots
display the magnitude of each study’s effect size as a function
of the sample’s standard error (Sterne et al., 2011), allowing
visual inspection of the symmetry of the meta-analytical study
distribution. In the funnel plots, the grey-shaded areas indicate
different levels of statistical signiﬁcance, whereas the white
(unshaded) area indicates the non-signiﬁcance of the study
effect sizes. In the presence of publication bias, it is expected
that the bottom of a plot (where the smaller studies are located)
will show a higher concentration of studies on one side of the
mean than the other. The missing studies in the underrepre-
sented area would primarily be located in the white (non-signif-
icant) regions of the plot. If these two visual features are
present, this would reﬂect publication bias, resulting from the
phenomenon that smaller studies only become published if
they have larger-than-average effects, because this makes them
more likely to attain statistical signiﬁcance criteria (Peters
et al., 2008; Sterne et al., 2011).
Second, we applied the trim-and-ﬁll method (Duval &
Tweedie, 2000) to identify and adjust for publication bias.
This method is an iterative, statistical procedure based upon
the notion that—in the absence of publication bias—the
funnel plot would be symmetrically dispersed around
the summary effect. The trim-and-ﬁll procedure estimatesEur. J. Pers. 29: 599–621 (2015)
DOI: 10.1002/per
Figure 1. Forest plot for the meta-analysis for ideological right-wing attitudes, grouped by type of ideological attitude (authoritarianism, conservatism and
dogmatism).
Ability, right-wing attitudes and prejudice 607the number of missing studies in a dataset by ‘trimming’ the
funnel plot until it is symmetrical and then ‘ﬁlling’ in both
sides of the funnel in a way that maintains symmetry. Based
upon the imputation (‘ﬁlling’) of missing effect sizes, the
procedure then re-estimates an adjusted pooled effect size
as sensitivity analysis. We added the trim-and-ﬁll imputa-
tions to the contour-enhanced funnel plots because they
help to inform the likely location of missing studies (Peters
et al., 2008).
Third, because the trim-and-ﬁll method has recently been
criticized in the literature (e.g. lower ability to detect publi-
cation bias and tendency for under-correction of publication
bias; Carter & McCullough, 2014; Peters et al., 2008), weCopyright © 2015 European Association of Personality Psychologyalso applied Egger’s linear regression procedure (Egger,
Smith, Schneider & Minder, 1997; Sterne & Egger, 2001).
This test is also based upon the funnel plot but does not im-
plicitly assume that publication bias is the only cause of fun-
nel plot asymmetry. Egger’s test can be described as a
weighted least squares regression model in which the effect
size is predicted by the standard error. The (non-)signiﬁ-
cance of the coefﬁcient associated with the standard error
(i.e. the slope, b1) is interpreted as a test of funnel plot asym-
metry and leads to a conclusion on the absence/presence of
publication bias (Sterne & Egger, 2001). Interestingly, the
use of this model is recently expanded by the recognition
that in Egger’s regression equation, the model’s interceptEur. J. Pers. 29: 599–621 (2015)
DOI: 10.1002/per
Figure 2. Forest plot for the meta-analysis for prejudice, grouped by type of prejudice.
608 E. Onraet et al.(b0) can be interpreted as an estimate of the underlying effect
size, which is theoretically uninﬂuenced by publication bias
(see, for extensive discussions, Carter & McCullough, 2014;
Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014). This expansion of the use
of Egger’s test is referred to as the ‘precision-effect test’
(PET; Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014). Simulation studies
have now shown that PET estimations are highly accurate
when the true meta-analytic effect is zero but tend to over-
correct when the true effect is non-zero. In these cases, the
intercept of a regression model in which the effect size is
predicted by the variance (i.e. standard error squared) pro-
vides more optimal estimates of the adjusted pooled effect
size. This is referred to as a ‘precision-effect with standard
error’ (or PEESE; Carter & McCullough, 2014; Stanley &
Doucouliagos, 2014). We adopted this conditional PET–
PEESE procedure (i.e. if b0 using PET is signiﬁcant,
PEESE-adjusted estimates should be interpreted as unbiased
effects) to calculate more accurate pooled effects adjusted
for publication bias.
In the ﬁnal step of the sensitivity analyses, we addressed
the impact of potential outliers and inﬂuential cases in the
two core meta-analyses. In addition to the contour-enhanced
funnel plot providing a ﬁrst visual sense of potential outliers
(Kepes et al., 2013), we applied the set of outlier and inﬂuence
diagnostics for the meta-analyses proposed by Viechtbauer
and Cheung (2010). This allows identiﬁcation of particularly
inﬂuential studies in both meta-analyses. Subsequently, we
re-ran the meta-analyses without these outliers to evaluate to
what extent these inﬂuential cases distort the conclusions of
the meta-analyses. This type of sensitivity analyses may either
strengthen the conclusions of the meta-analyses or leave some
doubts regarding their robustness (Viechtbauer & Cheung,
2010). All sensitivity analyses were conducted using the
metafor package in R (Viechtbauer, 2010).Copyright © 2015 European Association of Personality PsychologyRESULTS
We performed two separate meta-analyses, one for the rela-
tionship between cognitive ability and right-wing ideological
attitudes and one for the relationship between cognitive ability
and prejudice.Cognitive ability and right-wing ideological attitudes
Fifty-seven studies showed negative relations, nine showed pos-
itive relations and one showed a correlation of approximately 0.
The meta-analysis (for all results, see Table 2) revealed an over-
all moderate negative relation, r=.20, p< .001. In other
words, lower cognitive ability was associated with the stronger
endorsement of right-wing ideological attitudes.
Moderator analyses
Further analyses revealed that the effect size was heteroge-
neous, indicating that moderator variables might explain the
differences in effect size among the samples. We tested seven
potential moderators (i.e. general or broad primary ability,
type of broad ability, measure of right-wing ideological atti-
tudes, age group, sex composition, location and time period).
Because we investigated more than one moderator variable,
we corrected for multiple comparisons using a signiﬁcance
level of .007 (=.05/7). Three moderator variables reached this
signiﬁcance level. First, the type of right-wing ideological at-
titudes was a signiﬁcant moderator. More speciﬁcally, the
strongest effect sizes were found for authoritarianism
(r=.30), whereas weaker but still signiﬁcant effect sizes
were found for dogmatism (r=.17) and conservatism
(r=.13). Second, the moderator type of primary broad abil-
ity was also signiﬁcant. More speciﬁcally, the strongest ef-
fect sizes were obtained for long-term memory (r=.39),Eur. J. Pers. 29: 599–621 (2015)
DOI: 10.1002/per
Table 2. Moderators of effect sizes for studies on the relationship of cognitive ability and right-wing ideological attitudes
Moderator N k r 95%CI Qb Qw I
2
Total set 84 017 67 0.20*** [0.23, 0.17] 1058.06*** 93.76
General or primary broad ability 1.64 39.16
General ability 7 820 25 0.24*** [0.34, 0.14] 442.18*** 94.57
Primary broad ability 76 197 42 0.17*** [0.21, 0.14] 614.59*** 93.33
Type of primary broad ability† 27.41*** 78.11
Comprehension–knowledge 45 915 11 0.23*** [0.30, 0.16] 385.15*** 97.40
Fluid 21 207 18 0.13*** [0.18, 0.09] 102.01*** 83.34
Short-term memory 7 264 5 0.12*** [0.17, 0.07] 9.67 58.64
Long-term memory and retrieval 690 3 0.39** [0.62, 0.11] 30.33*** 93.41
Processing speed 100 1 0.20 [0.00, 0.38] 0.00 0.00
Visual–spatial processing 304 2 0.07 [0.27, 0.13] 2.40 58.33
Writing and reading 717 2 0.23*** [0.30, 0.16] 0.71 0.00
Type of ideological attitudes 24.13*** 91.71
Authoritarianism 18 142 27 0.30*** [0.34, 0.24] 147.22*** 82.34
Conservatism 63 740 27 0.13*** [0.17, 0.08] 657.63*** 96.05
Dogmatism 2 135 13 0.17*** [0.25, 0.09] 35.60*** 66.29
Age group 21.36*** 81.27
Children 16 604 7 0.15*** [0.17, 0.13] 9.5 36.85
Adolescents 15 496 8 0.32*** [0.39, 0.25] 42.52*** 84.62
Young adults 12 090 35 0.19*** [0.25, 0.13] 239.18*** 88.40
Adults 38 693 14 0.15*** [0.22, 0.07] 442.50*** 84.62
Mix 1 134 3 0.19 [0.40, 0.05] 15.85*** 87.38
Gender composition of sample 10.23** 80.45
Female only 8 433 5 0.14*** [0.16, 0.12] 4.06 1.42
Male only 11 168 15 0.18*** [0.28, 0.08] 256.26*** 94.54
Mix 64 416 47 0.21*** [0.25, 0.17] 775.46*** 94.07
Location 1.59 0.00
USA/Canada 62 427 48 0.21*** [0.25, 0.18] 710.10*** 93.38
Europe/UK 20 051 11 0.17*** [0.24, 0.10] 244.78*** 95.91
Other 1 539 8 0.14 [0.31, 0.04] 86.32*** 91.89
Time of data collection 4.86 58.88
1950–1969 2 462 20 0.28*** [0.36, 0.19] 85.07*** 77.66
1970–1989 3 269 13 0.17*** [0.27, 0.07] 86.82*** 86.18
1990–present 78 286 34 0.17*** [0.21, 0.13] 821.27*** 95.98
Note: All cognitive ability measures are coded so that higher scores reﬂect higher cognitive ability.
N, number of participants; k, number of studies; CI, conﬁdence interval; Qb, homogeneity statistic between classes; Qw, homogeneity statistic within classes. I
2,




†For this moderator analyses, we excluded the 27 samples measuring general ability, because these studies relate to a combination of different types of cognitive
ability. Hence, this moderator analysis is based only on the 42 samples with measures for one speciﬁc type of broad ability.
Ability, right-wing attitudes and prejudice 609comprehension–knowledge (r=.23) and writing and read-
ing (r=.23). Weaker, but still signiﬁcant, effect sizes were
found for ﬂuid abilities (r=.13) and short-term memory
(r=.12). Third, effect sizes signiﬁcantly differed across
age groups. More speciﬁcally, the effect size was strongest
when cognitive ability was measured among adolescents
(r=.32), compared with children (r=.15), young adults
(r=.19) or adults (r=.15).Cognitive ability and prejudice
We found 23 studies reporting correlations between cogni-
tive ability and prejudice, with 21 studies showing negative
relations, 1 showing a positive relation and 1 showing a cor-
relation of approximately 0. The overall effect size for this
relationship (Table 3) was comparable with the effect size
for right-wing ideological attitudes, r=.19, p< .001,Copyright © 2015 European Association of Personality Psychologyindicating that lower cognitive ability was associated with
stronger endorsement of prejudice.
Moderator analyses
We performed moderator analysis, revealing that the effect
size was heterogeneous. As a result, we investigated moder-
ator variables that might explain the differences in effect size
among the samples. We looked at the same moderator vari-
ables as in the previous meta-analysis, with the exception
of types of prejudice instead of types of right-wing ideologi-
cal attitudes. Again, we corrected for multiple comparisons
using a signiﬁcance level of .007 (=.05/7). We found evi-
dence for two signiﬁcant moderators. First, the type of preju-
dice was a signiﬁcant moderator. More speciﬁcally, the effect
size was strongest for ethnocentrism (r=.28) compared
with prejudice towards speciﬁc groups (r=.16). Second,
age group was a signiﬁcant moderator, with stronger effect
sizes in groups of adolescents (r=.24), adults (r=.23)Eur. J. Pers. 29: 599–621 (2015)
DOI: 10.1002/per
Table 3. Moderators of effect sizes for studies on the relationship of cognitive ability and prejudice
Moderator N k r 95% CI Qb Qw I
2
Total set 27 011 23 0.19*** [0.23, 0.16] 109.78*** 79.96
General or primary broad ability 3.6 72.21
General ability 6 330 7 0.27*** [0.36, 0.18] 18.67** 67.86
Primary broad ability 20 681 16 0.17*** [0.21, 0.13] 85.76*** 82.51
Type of primary broad ability† 12.58* 68.21
Comprehension–knowledge 3 778 4 0.26*** [0.32, 0.19] 10.70* 71.97
Fluid 9 517 8 0.15*** [0.21, 0.08] 25.41*** 72.45
Short-term memory 7 070 2 0.13*** [0.15, 0.10] 0.18 0.00
Processing speed 148 1 0.13 [0.29, 0.03] 0.00 0.00
Writing and reading 168 1 0.08 [0.23, 0.07] 0.00 0.00
Type of prejudice 11.78*** 91.51
Ethnocentrism 2 673 9 0.28*** [0.34, 0.22] 10.87 26.37
Prejudice towards speciﬁc groups 24 338 14 0.16*** [0.19, 0.13] 56.49*** 76.99
Age group 29.36*** 86.38
Children 16 497 9 0.13*** [0.17, 0.09] 30.57*** 73.83
Adolescents 134 2 0.24 [0.60, 0.20] 5.56* 82.03
Young adults 6 730 7 0.21*** [0.28, 0.14] 15.25* 60.66
Adults 1 740 4 0.23*** [0.27, 0.19] 1.37 .00
Mix 1 910 1 0.29*** [0.33, 0.25] 0.00 0.00
Gender composition of sample 6.81* 70.64
Female only 8 195 2 0.14*** [0.16, 0.12] 0.84 0.00
Male only 8 114 6 0.16*** [0.21, 0.11] 11.38* 56.04
Mix 10 702 15 0.23*** [0.28, 0.17] 72.27*** 80.63
Location 5.17* 80.67
USA/Canada 18 930 12 0.25*** [0.30, 0.19] 25.14** 56.24
Europe/UK 8 081 11 0.16*** [0.21, 0.11] 74.14*** 86.51
Time of data collection 2.75 27.28
1950–1969 583 6 0.25*** [0.34, 0.16] 6.98 28.37
1970–1989 7 348 5 0.22*** [0.28, 0.15] 10.25* 60.97
1990–present 19 080 12 0.17*** [0.22, 0.12] 83.51*** 86.83
Note: All cognitive ability measures are coded so that higher scores reﬂect higher cognitive ability.
N, number of participants; k, number of studies; CI, conﬁdence interval; Qb, homogeneity statistic between classes; Qw, homogeneity statistic within classes; I
2,




†For this moderator analyses, we excluded the seven samples measuring general ability, because these studies relate to a combination of different types of cog-
nitive ability. Hence, this moderator analysis is based only on the 16 samples with measures for one speciﬁc type of broad ability.
610 E. Onraet et al.and young adults (r=.21) compared with children
(r=.13). However, we acknowledge that only few samples
were included for each of these age groups, making this
moderator effect difﬁcult to meaningfully interpret.Sensitivity analyses
The validity of these two meta-analyses was addressed with
sensitivity analyses evaluating the impact of publication bias
and potential outliers/inﬂuential studies. These results are or-
ganized as an answer to three questions: (1) ‘Is there evi-
dence of publication bias?’; (2) ‘How do the pooled effect
sizes change if we adjust for potential publication bias?’;
and (3) ‘Which studies are outliers and how do they affect
the meta-analytic estimates?’. Publication bias and outlier
analyses were run on the full set of studies for the two
meta-analyses, with the publication bias analyses also run
on smaller sub-distributions (Kepes et al., 2012). We chose
to analyse publication bias for each type of right-wing ideo-
logical attitudes and prejudice, as analyses identiﬁed these asCopyright © 2015 European Association of Personality Psychologythe strongest moderator variables (explaining 93% and 42%
of between-study variance, respectively).
Is there evidence of publication bias?
This question is addressed by the joint interpretation of
three procedures: contour-enhanced funnel plots, the trim-
and-ﬁll procedure and signiﬁcance of Egger’s regression
tests (Kepes et al., 2012; Peters et al., 2008). Figure 3 pre-
sents the contour-enhanced funnel plot with trim-and-ﬁll
imputations for the (sub-)meta-analyses on cognitive ability
and right-wing ideological attitudes. The trim-and-ﬁll
method on the overall meta-analysis (Figure 3A) suggests
that 11 studies are missing at the right of the mean effect
size. As the contour-enhanced funnel plot allows evaluation
of the missing studies in the context of statistical signiﬁ-
cance, it can be noted that 10 of 11 studies are located in
the grey-shaded areas of the plot. This suggests that funnel
plot asymmetry primarily results from factors other than
publication bias. Indeed, the separate publication bias anal-
yses for each type of right-wing ideological attitudes
(Figure 3B–D) strengthen this hypothesis as there is strongEur. J. Pers. 29: 599–621 (2015)
DOI: 10.1002/per
Figure 3. Contour-enhanced funnel plots with trim-and-ﬁll imputations for cognitive ability and right-wing ideological attitudes. The black points represent the
real studies; the white points represent the imputed studies. If missing studies are imputed in areas where non-signiﬁcant studies would be plotted (no shading),
the observed asymmetry may be due to publication bias. If missing studies are imputed in areas of statistical signiﬁcance (darker shading), publication bias is less
likely.
Ability, right-wing attitudes and prejudice 611moderator-induced between-study heterogeneity. More spe-
ciﬁcally, within the sub-distributions for both authoritarian-
ism (Figure 3B) and conservatism (Figure 3C), trim-and-ﬁll
method no longer imputes studies at any side of the mean.
Only for dogmatism (Figure 3D) are two studies imputed
in the grey area. However, as this sub-distribution only in-
cludes 13 studies, these imputations can also be caused by
the small set of studies in this meta-analysis. For all (sub-)meta-
analyses, Egger’s regression tests for funnel plot asymmetry
were performed. However, in none of these regression
models were signiﬁcant slope coefﬁcients found. This also
strengthens the conclusion that publication bias is unlikely
to distort the pooled estimate between cognitive ability and
right-wing ideological attitudes.
Similar results are found for the (sub-)meta-analyses on
the association between cognitive ability and prejudice.
Figure 4 presents the contour-enhanced funnel plot with
trim-and-ﬁll imputations for the overall meta-analysis on
prejudice (Figure 4A) and the speciﬁc types of prejudices:
ethnocentrism (Figure 4B) and prejudice towards speciﬁc
groups (Figure 4C). The trim-and-ﬁll method on the overallCopyright © 2015 European Association of Personality Psychologymeta-analysis imputes four studies at the right of the mean,
with only two of them located in the white (non-signiﬁcant)
area of the plot. The trim-and-ﬁll method imputed three miss-
ing studies in the meta-analysis of ethnocentrism and one in
the meta-analysis prejudice towards speciﬁc groups. How-
ever, funnel plot asymmetry in these subsets might be pri-
marily related to the limited number of included studies.
Also, for all (sub-)meta-analyses, Egger’s regression tests
yield no signiﬁcant slope coefﬁcients. This strengthens the
conclusion that publication bias is unlikely to distort the rela-
tion between cognitive ability and prejudice.
How do the pooled effect sizes change if we adjust for po-
tential publication bias?
Table 4 presents the original and adjusted effect sizes pro-
vided by the trim-and-ﬁll procedure and extended Egger’s
regression procedure (i.e. PET–PEESE estimators). In line
with the previous analyses, adjusted effect sizes are strongly
similar to the original meta-analytic estimates. All estimates
remain signiﬁcant (p< .001), and hence, the PEESE results
can be regarded as the best estimates of the effect sizesEur. J. Pers. 29: 599–621 (2015)
DOI: 10.1002/per
Figure 4. Contour-enhanced funnel plots with trim-and-ﬁll imputations for cognitive ability and prejudice. The black points represent the real studies; the white
points represent the imputed studies. If missing studies are imputed in areas where non-signiﬁcant studies would be plotted (no shading), the observed asymmetry
may be due to publication bias. If missing studies are imputed in areas of statistical signiﬁcance (darker shading), publication bias is less likely.
612 E. Onraet et al.corrected for publication bias (Carter & McCullough, 2014;
Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014). Notably, these PEESE
estimates provide a somewhat less negative effect between
cognitive ability and right-wing ideological attitudes
(r=.15) and between cognitive ability and authoritarianism
(r=.23). All other PEESE estimates resemble the original
estimates.Which studies are outliers and how do they affect the pooled
effect sizes?
In the funnel plots of the overall meta-analyses (Figures 3A
and 4A), no marked outliers were noted. Additionally, we
performed a set of inﬂuence diagnostics for meta-analyses
(Viechtbauer & Cheung, 2010) to identify particularly inﬂu-
ential cases. The last column of Table 4 presents the meta-
analytic results without these outliers. In the right-wing
ideological attitudes meta-analysis, three outliers/inﬂuential
cases were identiﬁed. Interestingly, each of these studies
represents each of the three types of right-wing ideological
attitudes. For authoritarianism, the study of Rubinstein
(2003) was identiﬁed as an outlier. This study provided a
substantially stronger effect size (r=.67; N=111) than
the other studies on authoritarianism. For conservatism, the
study of Oskarsson et al. (in press) was identiﬁed as an out-
lier. This study is the only one to report a positive correlation
(r= .18). Moreover, the study used a large sample
(N=1946), adding substantial weight to the analysis. For
dogmatism, the study of Taylor and Dunnette (1974) was
identiﬁed as an outlier. This study is also the only one to re-
port a positive correlation between cognitive ability and
dogmatism (r= .29, N=79). In the prejudice meta-analysis,
inﬂuence diagnostics only identify Meeusen et al. (2013;
r=.29) as an outlier. This study addressed ethnocentrism
in a much larger sample (N=1910) than the other ethnocen-
trism studies, and hence, its estimate adds substantial weight
to the meta-analysis.
Nevertheless, removing these four inﬂuential studies
from the meta-analyses appears to have only very limited ef-
fect on the meta-analytic effect sizes (Table 4). Hence, thisCopyright © 2015 European Association of Personality Psychologytype of sensitivity analyses also validates the robustness of
the current meta-analytic conclusions.GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present meta-analyses of the relationship of cognitive
ability with ideological right-wing ideological attitudes and
intergroup prejudice yielded four important results. First,
we obtained convincing evidence for the presence of moder-
ate negative associations between cognitive ability and both
ideological right-wing attitudes and prejudice, which were
relatively stable across different sample characteristics. Sec-
ond, the negative relationship varied signiﬁcantly across dif-
ferent subtypes of broad cognitive ability for ideological
attitudes, but not for prejudice. Third, our analyses revealed
that cognitive ability was not related to all types of right-
wing ideological attitudes or prejudices equivalently. Fourth,
sensitivity analyses show that the results are not strongly in-
ﬂuenced by publication bias or inﬂuential cases. In the next
sections, we discuss each of these ﬁndings in greater depth.Finding 1: general relationship of cognitive ability with
ideology and prejudice
The ﬁrst main ﬁnding of our study was that people with
greater cognitive resources are more likely to adhere to left-
wing beliefs and tend to be less prejudiced, whereas those
having lower cognitive abilities are more likely to endorse
right-wing beliefs and be more prejudiced (average effect
sizes of r=.20, 95% CI [0.23, 0.17]; and r=.19,
95% CI [0.23, 0.16], respectively). The conﬁdence inter-
val reported provides considerable support for the notion that
these ﬁndings are both meaningful and replicable. We further
assessed the validity of our meta-analytical estimates, with
sensitivity analyses addressing the impact of both publication
bias and outliers/inﬂuential studies. In general, these analyses
underscore robustness in our meta-analytical study because
the implications of the meta-analytic results and conclusions


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Ability, right-wing attitudes and prejudice 613
Copyright © 2015 European Association of Personality Psychologypublication bias or when omitting outliers and overly inﬂuen-
tial studies.
A straightforward comparison between the results of the
present meta-analysis and the meta-analysis conducted by
Van Hiel et al. (2010), who also investigated the relationship
between cognitive ability and ideological attitudes, is not
possible. First, Van Hiel et al. (2010) included ideological at-
titudes and ethnocentrism in the same analysis, whereas we
performed two separate analyses. Second, and most impor-
tantly, Van Hiel et al. (2010) also included years of education
as a proxy of cognitive ability, whereas we chose not to
include this variable as an indicator of cognitive ability and
instead focused only on objective tasks measuring cognitive
ability. As can be seen from their results, years of education
yields the strongest effect size compared with other indica-
tors of cognitive ability, making their overall effect sizes
for the different types of ideology higher than the present
effect sizes.
Moderator analyses revealed that the effect size in the
present meta-analysis was relatively stable across different
sample characteristics, such as gender, location and time
frame, attesting to the robustness of the relationship. Only
one moderator related to sample characteristics yielded a sig-
niﬁcant effect. Speciﬁcally, the strength of the effect size dif-
fered across age groups, with the strongest effect size for the
relationship between cognitive ability and right-wing ideo-
logical attitudes in the group of adolescents. Although we
do not have a clear explanation for this effect, it should be
noted that adolescence constitutes the formative years of po-
litical ideology (e.g. Altemeyer, 1998; Alwin, Cohen, &
Newcomb, 1991) and that cognitive ability might then yield
its biggest impact. Future research can further examine this
potential.
Our effect sizes varied around r=.20 and were largest
in magnitude for authoritarianism (r=.30, 95% CI
[0.34, 0.24]) and ethnocentrism (r=.28, 95% CI
[0.34, .22]). Clearly, these effects are not inconsequential
but rather are of a similar magnitude of other meta-analytic
relations such as between contact and prejudice (Pettigrew
& Tropp, 2006), stereotypes and prejudice (Dovidio,
Brigham, Johnson & Gaertner, 1996), discrimination and
prejudice (Talaska, Fiske & Chaiken, 2008; Schütz & Six,
1996), personality factors and prejudice (Sibley & Duckitt,
2008) and even stronger than relations between religiosity
and prejudice (Hall, Matz & Wood, 2010). In fact, these ef-
fect sizes approximate those of the vast majority of personal-
ity and social psychology ﬁndings more generally (Richard,
Bond & Stokes-Zoota, 2003). With meta-analytic relations
of this magnitude reliably observed, a strong case can be
made that cognitive abilities are as important, and often more
important, in explaining ideology and prejudice than many of
the constructs commonly discussed in personality and social
psychology textbooks. Hence, we strongly advise future
models and theories aiming to uncover the psychological ba-
sis of ideology and prejudice to provide a key role for cogni-
tive ability (Dhont & Hodson, 2014; Hodson, 2014; Hodson
& Busseri, 2012).
An important reason for this long-standing interest in the
cognitive basis of ideology lies in an attempt to uncover theEur. J. Pers. 29: 599–621 (2015)
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the superiority of other ideologies (Durrheim, 1997). Specif-
ically, ideologies might seem inferior when they attract less
intelligent people, whereas ideologies that attract intelligent
people may appear to be more ‘correct’. To be clear, any at-
tempt to show whether right-wing or left-wing ideologies are
accurate or valid on the basis of the level of cognitive ability
of their adherents is based on false premises and certainly not
the goal of our present synthesis.
Moreover, we appreciate that this issue is a very delicate
and controversial one (Dhont & Hodson, 2014; Hodson,
2014) that, for this reason, speaks to the need for a
cumulative-science approach (i.e. meta-analysis). Moreover,
we would like to stress that, although right-wing ideological
attitudes relate to conservative and right-wing political party
afﬁliation (e.g. Altemeyer, 1996; Jost et al., 2003), our ﬁnd-
ings cannot be generalized to party identiﬁcation. In other
words, the current ﬁndings not necessarily imply that adher-
ents of right-wing parties have lower cognitive abilities than
adherents of left-wing parties.Finding 2: different effect sizes for different types of
broad cognitive ability
The second important question of the present study pertained
to the potential differences in effect sizes for different types
of cognitive abilities. Previous studies (Deary et al., 2008;
Heaven et al., 2011; Kemmelmeier, 2008) yielded somewhat
conﬂicting outcomes. In our meta-analysis, we investigated
two moderators in order to answer this question. First, we
found that the strength of the relationship did not differ be-
tween studies focusing on one speciﬁc type of cognitive abil-
ity and those focusing on general cognitive ability. Second,
we compared the effect sizes between different types of
broad cognitive abilities as deﬁned by the CHC theory
(McGrew, 2005; Schneider & McGrew, 2012). Our analysis
for right-wing attitude effect sizes varied signiﬁcantly across
ability types. To interpret this effect, we focus on
comprehension–knowledge, ﬂuid abilities and short-term
memory, because we have a smaller number of participants
(<1000) for the other types of broad abilities. The strongest
effect size was obtained for comprehension–knowledge
(r=.23), which refers to abilities based on previously ac-
quired knowledge and skills valued by one’s culture. It in-
cludes general verbal information, language development,
lexical knowledge, listening and communication abilities
and grammar sensitivity (Schneider & McGrew, 2012). The
effect size was considerably smaller for ﬂuid abilities
(r=.13), referring to abilities to solve unfamiliar problems
and abstract reasoning, and for short-term memory
(r=.12), referring to abilities to encode, maintain and ma-
nipulate information in the immediate situation. Although
the moderator for type of primary broad ability was not
signiﬁcant in our analysis for prejudice, the same pattern of
results emerged, with the strongest effect size for
comprehension–knowledge (r=.26) and weaker effect
sizes for ﬂuid abilities (r=.15) and short-term memory
(r=.13).Copyright © 2015 European Association of Personality PsychologyThese ﬁndings corroborate the studies of Heaven et al.
(2011) and Kemmelmeier (2008) who found that verbal abil-
ities are more strongly related to ideological attitudes com-
pared with numerical and mathematical reasoning. As noted
by Heaven et al. (2011), ideologies are relevant to verbal nar-
ratives, arguments and point of views, but not directly to nu-
merical abilities. Similarly, other researchers argue that
ideology can be considered as a schema or a learned knowl-
edge structure, including norms and values, beliefs and opin-
ions (e.g. Fiske, Lau & Smith, 1990; Hamill, Lodge & Blake,
1985). Hence, this might explain why comprehension–
knowledge abilities may be especially relevant in relation-
ship with ideology.
Also of relevance to the present ﬁndings is the recognition
that cognitive ability is associated with particular personality
traits, which also lie at the basis of right-wing ideological at-
titudes and prejudice. More speciﬁcally, high openness
(Costa & McCrae, 1992; Digman, 1990), which refers to a
preference for novelty, variety and intense experience, lies
at the basis of lower authoritarianism and conservatism and
lower prejudice (Block & Block, 2006; Sibley & Duckitt,
2008). At the same time, several researchers have shown that
openness is also related to cognitive ability, with the strongest
associations for comprehension–knowledge abilities, com-
pared with other types of cognitive ability, such as ﬂuid
ability (Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997; Ashton, Lee, Vernon
& Jang, 2000). This common personality association may
also provide insights into the stronger relationships of
comprehension–knowledge abilities with right-wing ideolog-
ical attitudes and prejudice.
Whereas the effect of comprehension–knowledge ability
is strongest, it is important to note that the other types of
broad abilities (for which we obtained enough studies) also
yielded negative and signiﬁcant effects. This ﬁnding further
attests to the robustness of this general relationship. How-
ever, on the basis of the present state of the literature, we can-
not make conclusive statements about all types of cognitive
abilities. First, studies on cognitive ability and ideology and
prejudice did not include every type of ability (e.g. to our
knowledge, no study investigated auditory processing or
quantitative knowledge). Second, for other types of cognitive
ability, most notably long-term memory, processing speed
and visual–spatial processing, we found only a few studies,
which elicited potential statistical power issues in our analy-
sis. Hence, we should be cautious not to over-interpret the
results for these speciﬁc abilities. Future research administer-
ing a wide range of cognitive ability measures at the same
time can provide a more decisive answer to this intriguing
question.Finding 3: different effect sizes for different types of
ideological attitudes and prejudice
Our analyses revealed that cognitive ability is not related to
all types of right-wing ideological attitudes or prejudices to
the same extent. First, in our analysis of right-wing ideolog-
ical attitudes, we found the strongest effect size for authori-
tarianism as compared with conservatism and dogmatism.
One possible explanation lies in particular rigid cognitiveEur. J. Pers. 29: 599–621 (2015)
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Research indicated that lower cognitive ability is associated
with a higher NFC (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), which re-
lates to an individual’s desire to come to a relatively quick
closure in decisions and judgments (Kruglanski, 1989;
Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Individuals with a high NFC
have a strong preference for structure, certainty and predict-
ability and are repelled by ambiguity. Because of these
needs, individuals with a high NFC are more attracted to
right-wing ideological attitudes, because these attitudes
stress the importance of traditional values and the resistance
towards change (Roets & Van Hiel, 2006). Of interest, NFC
is more strongly related to authoritarianism than other types
of ideological attitudes, like conservatism (Chirumbolo,
2002; Crowson, Thoma & Hestevold, 2005; Van Hiel,
Pandelaere & Duriez, 2004). Authoritarianism may be espe-
cially functional in reducing ambiguity and providing a sense
of certainty, because ‘RWA attitudes… would provide for in-
dividuals the strongest level of closure on social and political
issues’ (Crowson et al., 2005, p. 574). In the present context,
individuals with lower cognitive abilities may similarly ben-
eﬁt from more certainty and closure, which, in the context on
ideas about society, are best met through authoritarian beliefs
relative to other right-wing attitudes. Whereas cognitive
styles may provide an explanation for the strongest effects
found between cognitive ability and authoritarianism, we
should note that the sensitivity bias analyses (Table 4) re-
vealed that the actual effect size of authoritarianism might
be somewhat lower, bringing them closer to the effect sizes
of conservatism and dogmatism. Hence, we should interpret
these ﬁndings with caution.
A second interesting ﬁnding concerned two types of prej-
udices. More speciﬁcally, ethnocentrism, which can be con-
sidered an indicator of generalized prejudice, yielded a
stronger effect size than prejudices directed towards speciﬁc
out-groups. In other words, cognitive ability related more
strongly to negative attitudes and a dislike of other groups
in general, rather than speciﬁc groups such as ethnic minori-
ties or the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered commu-
nity. A similar effect can be found in research on the
personality basis of prejudice. More speciﬁcally, Sibley and
Duckitt (2008) found that (low) agreeableness or openness
to experience is more strongly related to measures of gener-
alized than speciﬁc prejudices. These authors argued that,
because speciﬁc types of prejudice are partly rooted in
knowledge about and (personal) experiences with these par-
ticular groups, these situational and group-speciﬁc factors
might attenuate the generalized effect of personality (see also
Akrami, Ekehammar & Bergh, 2011). Generalized prejudice,
on the other hand, is more abstract and less inﬂuenced by
group-speciﬁc attitudes and cognitions, yielding a stronger
effect of personality. Similar processes can explain the pres-
ent ﬁndings for cognitive ability as well. Cognitive ability
might yield its strongest effects on generalized prejudice be-
cause of the reliance on general cognitive heuristics during
judgment formation that is similar across all out-groups; in
contrast, speciﬁc prejudice types are additionally inﬂuenced
by factors uniquely related to the particular social group in
question (including the social context).Copyright © 2015 European Association of Personality PsychologyFinding 4: little evidence for publication bias or
distortion by outliers
Given the controversial nature of studying the relationship of
cognitive ability with right-wing ideological attitudes and
prejudice, a crucial question is to what extent the studies in-
cluded in the current meta-analyses represent the entire sam-
ple collection. It might be that studies retrieving null ﬁndings
or positive ﬁndings are more likely to be put away in ﬁle
drawers. A deﬁnite strength of this meta-analysis is that we
addressed this issue by comprehensively addressing the im-
pact of publication bias. These analyses, based upon visual
inspection, regression and trim-and-ﬁll methods, do not yield
evidence that publication bias is likely in the present meta-
analytic study collection. Nevertheless, it remains important
for future updates of this meta-analysis to further search for
additional unpublished studies. Despite our widespread call
for unpublished data, only three researchers shared their un-
published data, and more unpublished datasets might be out
somewhere.
Taken together, our sensitivity analyses accounting for
publication bias and removing outliers/inﬂuential studies un-
derscore and validate the robustness of our meta-analytical
conclusions. Some other potential biases, however, could
not be completely ruled out. First, it remains possible that
the current meta-analytical conclusions do not reﬂect the true
effects, owing to measurement error. Even though adjusting
for measurement error is recommended by some meta-
analysts (particularly in the psychometric meta-analytical tra-
dition of Hunter & Schmidt, 2004; Kepes et al., 2013), we
found insufﬁcient information in the original studies to con-
duct such artefact adjustments. Also, we acknowledge that
it is possible that the results of our meta-analysis are some-
what inﬂuenced by indirect range restriction (Hunter &
Schmidt, 2004; Kepes et al., 2013). Many studies consist of
volunteers, and volunteers may tend to have a higher-than-
average cognitive ability. However, as information of the
population variances on the outcome measures is essentially
lacking in the original studies, it was not possible to correct
for this artefact as part of the current sensitivity analyses.Alternative accounts
Some scholars have criticized a pure ‘cognitive’ explanation
of the negative relationship of cognitive ability with ideology
and prejudice and suggest alternative accounts explaining
these relationships. More speciﬁcally, social desirability, ed-
ucation and socio-economic status (SES) have often been
proposed as explaining these effects. We elaborate on these
alternative accounts in the next sections.
Social desirability
Studies included in our meta-analysis exclusively employed
self-report measures of ideology and prejudice. Although
self-report questionnaires are omnipresent in research and
generally considered as a valid and reliable method to mea-
sure attitudes, it may provoke some interpretation problems
as well, particularly with regard to social desirability. People
may try to suppress or mask what they think to be sociallyEur. J. Pers. 29: 599–621 (2015)
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and (extreme) right-wing ideological opinions. Indeed, intel-
ligent and educated individuals are quite capable of suppress-
ing their prejudices (e.g. Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Hence,
an alternative account might be that individuals with lower
cognitive abilities are less able to suppress their socially un-
acceptable attitudes, whereas individuals with greater cogni-
tive abilities are more likely to present themselves as open-
minded, liberal and unprejudiced.
However, whereas social desirability poses an important
limitation to questionnaire studies, the self-report nature of
the attitudinal measures cannot adequately explain the ob-
tained meta-analytic relationships for various reasons. More
speciﬁcally, utterances that support extreme right-wing ideo-
logical ideas and prejudice expressions are widely rejected in
the general population, and it does not require especially
strong cognitive abilities to comply with these norms. More-
over, relatively simple and straightforward questions are
used to measure prejudice, tapping into (dis)liking of and
avoiding contact with different out-groups, making it un-
likely that only highly intelligent individuals are able to ma-
nipulate their answers on these questions (Hodson & Busseri,
2012). Furthermore, the relations observed in the present
results are similar to those in samples of young children
(e.g. Costello & Hodson, 2014; Kutner & Gordon, 1964),
who often feel freer to express their own minds. Moreover,
our effects are strongest (not weakest) in adolescence, a life
phase where individuals are most conscious of social approval
and norms. Given these arguments, we feel that increased
social desirability among individuals with higher cognitive
ability cannot explain completely the obtained relationships.
However, future research might try to replicate the present
ﬁnding by employing other implicit or more subtle measures
for these attitudes that are less prone to social desirability
concerns.
Education and socio-economic status
Scholars have often suggested that SES and educational ex-
periences may pose potential confounds in the relationship
of cognitive ability with right-wing ideological attitudes
and intergroup prejudice (Adorno et al., 1950; Allport,
1954; Christie, 1954). More speciﬁcally, because education
and cultural sophistication are known to inﬂuence the values
and attitudes of individuals and because higher education
typically provides a ‘liberal climate’, high SES and participa-
tion in higher education may make individuals more liberal
and left-wing and less prejudiced (e.g. Hello, Scheepers,
Vermulst & Gerris, 2004). Indeed, empirical studies showed
that educational level is negatively correlated with right-wing
ideology (e.g. an effect size of r=.33 in the meta-analysis
of Van Hiel et al., 2010), prejudice and ethnocentrism (e.g.
Hello, Scheepers, & Sleegers, 2006; Meeusen et al., 2013).
Hence, because individuals with higher cognitive ability are
more likely to pursue higher and longer education, the effects
of cognitive ability on ideological attitudes and prejudice
might be explained by this ‘liberalizing effect’ of education
rather than by pure ‘cognitive effects’.
However, empirical research suggests that a potential
confounding effect of education and SES does not accountCopyright © 2015 European Association of Personality Psychologyfor these relations. Most importantly, a range of studies re-
ported that the relationships of cognitive ability with right-
wing ideology and prejudice remain signiﬁcant after statisti-
cally controlling for educational level and SES (Deary et al.,
2008; Hodson & Busseri, 2012; Kanazawa, 2010; McCourt
et al., 1999; Schoon et al., 2010; Sidanius & Lau, 1989).
Moreover, signiﬁcant associations of cognitive ability with
right-wing ideological attitudes and prejudice have also been
obtained in samples of children and young adolescents who
have not yet experienced higher education (e.g. Costello &
Hodson, 2014) and among university student samples (e.g.
Choma et al., 2014; Keiller, 2010) where education levels
are largely equivalent across participants. In sum, whereas
education and SES might, to some extent, explain the rela-
tionship between cognitive ability and right-wing ideological
attitudes and prejudice, it cannot serve as a single and ex-
haustive explanation.Towards new theories on the cognitive basis of right-wing
ideology and prejudice
We introduce two new perspectives in the ﬁeld of cognition
and ideology, which hold promise for future research. First,
we discuss the need to focus more research attention towards
the interplay between cognitive ability and cognitive style in
explaining ideology and prejudice. Second, we argue to
study affective processes as well and discuss the interplay be-
tween cognition and affect in the context of ideology and
prejudice.An integrated theory of cognition: the interplay between
ability and style
Recent theorizing has stressed that both cognitive resources
and motivation are important variables in decision-making
and information processing (Kruglanski, 2004; Kruglanski,
Pierro, Mannetti, Erb & Chun 2007; Kruglanski et al.,
2012; Roets, Van Hiel, Cornelis & Soetens, 2008; Wright
& Kirby, 2001). For example, Kruglanski et al. (2007) have
argued that cognitive resources (i.e. cognitive ability) and
motivation (i.e. motivated cognition or cognitive style) are
the two key ‘decision maker’ parameters in human judgment
(see also Kruglanski, 2004). Although both of these variables
might exert direct effects on judgment, they may show im-
portant multiplicative effects as well (Roets et al., 2008).
Potential joint inﬂuences (simultaneous or interaction ef-
fects) of cognitive ability and style are especially interesting
in the context of the present research questions. Instead of
probing into the effects of cognitive ability and cognitive
style separately, it may be more interesting to considerer both
concepts simultaneously (Dhont & Hodson, 2014; Hodson,
2014; Hodson & Busseri, 2012; Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli,
Koehler & Fugelsang, 2012). Adorno et al. (1950) already
hinted to such a possibility, and they coined this ‘promising
ﬁeld of future research … the dynamics of intelligence’
(p. 278). Cognitive ability in itself does not provide a com-
plete answer to the question of why people hold certain be-
liefs and attitudes; rather, the dynamic interplay between
ability and style should be considered.Eur. J. Pers. 29: 599–621 (2015)
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important ﬁnding deserves special attention here. When
cognitive ability is lower or task demands grossly exceed
the individual’s resources, people may cease further efforts
to solve the problem (Roets et al., 2008; Wright & Kirby,
2001). It is possible that such a breakdown in one’s willing-
ness to invest in information gathering has also great
relevance for the development of right-wing ideology and
prejudice. People lower in cognitive ability may perceive
the world as particularly difﬁcult to understand and, irrespec-
tive of their cognitive style preferences, gravitate towards
simpler heuristics and traditional worldviews instead of be-
ing open for new and challenging information (e.g. Heaven
et al., 2011; Keiller, 2010; Stankov, 2009). It is unfortunate
that, at least to our knowledge, no single study has investi-
gated the interplay between cognitive ability and style
measures in the context of right-wing ideological attitudes
or prejudice. In order to develop comprehensive cognitive
theories about right-wing ideological attitudes and prejudice,
future studies should certainly include both cognition
components.
An integrated theory of cognition and affect
We acknowledge that a one-sided focus on cognition is
rather limited and that, in order to understand right-wing
ideological attitudes and prejudice, affective factors should
also be considered. Thus, a more complete model of right-
wing ideological attitudes and prejudice arguably incorpo-
rates affect as well. In classic theories on right-wing ideolog-
ical attitudes, this affective component was thought to be
dominant (e.g. Adorno et al., 1950; Wilson, 1973). For ex-
ample, Meloen (1997) argued, ‘Adorno et al. furthermore
hardly used the concept of cognition, as they were convinced
that also more emotional factors were involved, while cogni-
tions often would merely serve as rationalizations’ (p. 650).
Although both cognitive and affective variables have been
studied separately, theoretical models and empirical studies
have rarely examined these variables simultaneously. Re-
cently, Dhont and Hodson (2014; see also Hodson, 2014) in-
troduced the Cognitive Ability and Style to Evaluation
(CASE) model, a conceptual model of ideology and preju-
dice, which holds that right-wing ideology and prejudice re-
sult from the interplay between cognitive, affective and
motivational factors. Speciﬁcally, the CASE model proposes
that individuals with lower cognitive abilities and prefer-
ences for simple structure, order and predictability are more
inclined to perceive the surrounding societal context as
threatening. In turn, threat stimulates a focus on the status
quo, which ultimately develops into right-wing and conser-
vative ideologies and prejudice. However, this model is in
need of future research to test its assumptions.Limitations of the current state of the literature
As a ﬁnal note, we would like to address two limitations of the
current state of the literature concerning cognitive ability, ide-
ology and prejudice, which we think are important issues to
tackle in future research. First, whereas a large focus is placed
on social–cultural right-wing attitudes in relationship withCopyright © 2015 European Association of Personality Psychologycognitive ability, few studies have investigated economic–
hierarchical attitudes in this context. We will further reﬂect
on the possible relationship. Second, we discuss the need
for cross-cultural validation of the obtained relationships.
Cognitive ability and economic–hierarchical right-wing
attitudes
In the literature on cognitive ability and right-wing ideologi-
cal attitudes, almost all attention is directed towards social–
cultural ideological right-wing attitudes. However, Duckitt
and colleagues (e.g., Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009)
distinguished between social–cultural attitudes and
economic–hierarchical right-wing attitudes, and this distinc-
tion proved to be very important for our understanding of
the attitudinal basis of prejudice. Social dominance orienta-
tion (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994) is
the most frequently studied variable situated in the economic–
hierarchical domain of right-wing ideological attitudes. SDO
is deﬁned as a preference for hierarchically structured group
relations and inequality among social groups. A relevant ques-
tion, then, is whether cognitive ability is related to economic–
hierarchical attitudes to the same extent as to social–cultural
attitudes. Only a few studies have directly compared social–
cultural attitudes and economic–hierarchical ideological
attitudes in relationship with cognitive ability. Heaven et al.
(2011) reported that cognitive ability yields stronger associa-
tions with RWA than with SDO. Likewise, Choma et al.
(2014) observed that RWA, but not SDO, is signiﬁcantly
related to a lower cognitive ability. A recent study by
Oskarsson et al. (2014) reported that general cognitive ability
is positively related to right-wing economic attitudes. Similarly,
Carl (2014, 2015) showed that cognitive ability was positively
associated with ﬁscally and economically conservative beliefs.
These studies thus seem to suggest that the relationship
between cognitive ability and economic–hierarchical atti-
tudes is distinct from the relationship between cognitive abil-
ity and social–cultural attitudes. However, based on the few
available empirical studies on the relationship between
cognitive ability and economic–hierarchical attitudes, we
cannot make strong claims about the strength and direction
of this relationship. Therefore, we encourage more system-
atic research employing a wide range of measures in the
economic–hierarchical domain in order to understand the
role of cognitive abilities in the development of economic–
hierarchical attitudes.
The impact of culture: universal or culture-speciﬁc
relationship?
An important limitation of the current state of the literature
on cognitive ability and ideology and prejudice resides in
the fact that the literature is overrepresented by studies con-
ducted in Western societies. As a result, our meta-analytic
ﬁnding can only be applied with certainty in these societies;
whether or not these ﬁndings can be generalized to non-
Western societies largely remains an unanswered question.
According to the cultural mediation hypothesis (Woodley,
2010, 2011), we could ﬁnd different patterns of results in
other societies. More speciﬁcally, Woodley asserts that indi-
viduals with higher cognitive ability are more likely to beEur. J. Pers. 29: 599–621 (2015)
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dominant in one’s society and hence will shift their own atti-
tudes and beliefs towards this normative centre. As a result,
and in line with the present ﬁndings, in societies with rather
liberal norms (such as most Western societies), individuals
with greater cognitive skills are predicted to be generally
more left-wing. However, in societies characterized by more
conservative and rightist norms and belief systems, one could
expect those individuals to shift to the right side of the
spectrum. We know of one study that supports this interesting
possibility. Katz (1990) reported that among White South
African students, a group characterized by conservative views
at that time, greater cognitive ability was associated with
more conservative and traditionalistic views. However, given
that this is the only study of its kind and that its ﬁndings did
not apply to all ability tasks used, we recommend caution in
interpreting these results. In sum, in order to provide a conclu-
sive answer to the question of whether the present ﬁndings are
context speciﬁc and typical for Western societies or whether
the obtained relationships can be considered universal, we
need more elaborate research on the relationship of cognitive
ability with ideology and prejudice in culturally diverse soci-
etal contexts.CONCLUSION
The present meta-analysis reveals relationships of small-to-
moderate strength between (lower) cognitive ability and
right-wing ideology and prejudice. These ﬁndings further en-
force the call of Hodson and Busseri (2012) that ‘…cognitive
abilities, particular in relationship to ideology, need to be-
come increasingly focal to and integrated into existing
literatures’ (p. 193). Future research should not refrain from
further investigating this interesting, albeit controversial, re-
lationship (Hodson, 2014). Rather, the inclusion of cognitive
ability as an important variable in a comprehensive model of
ideology and prejudice, together with other individual differ-
ences and situational factors, will provide a fuller account of
why some individuals are less tolerant and more prejudiced
than others.REFERENCES
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